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It is widely accepted that valid consent is a necessary condition for permissible 
sexual activity. Since non-human animals, children, and individuals who are severely 
cognitively disabled, heavily intoxicated or unconscious, lack the cognitive capacity 
to give valid consent, this condition explains why it is impermissible to have sex with 
them. however, contrary to common intuitions, the same condition seems to render 
it impermissible to have sex with robots, for they too are incapable of consenting to 
sex due to insufficient cognitive capacitation. this paper explores whether the intu-
ition that non-consensual sex with robots is permissible can be vindicated, whilst 
preserving valid consent as a general requirement for permissible sexual activity. I 
develop and evaluate four possible ways to argue that there is a morally significant 
difference between robots on the one hand, and insufficiently cognitively capacitated 
humans and non-human animals on the other hand, to substantiate and justify the 
intuition that it is permissible to have non-consensual sex with the former but not 
with the latter. 
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0. IntRodUctIon
In ethical discourse, valid consent is usually taken to be a necessary condition 
for permissible sexual activity (archard 2007; cahill 2001; cowling et al. 2017; Soble 
et al. 2002). Since non-human animals, children, and individuals who are severely 
cognitively disabled, heavily intoxicated or unconscious, lack the cognitive capacity 
to give valid consent, this condition renders it impermissible to have sex with them. 
however, the claim that valid consent is necessary for permissible sexual activity 
seems to imply that it is also impermissible to have sex with robots, for they too are 
incapable of consenting because they lack the requisite cognitive capacities. 
I suspect that many people find this apparent implication counterintuitive, even 
though they would endorse the view that valid consent is a necessary condition for 
permissible sex. hence, many people seem to hold conflicting intuitions about the 
permissibility of non -consensual sex between cases in which the non-consenting 
subject is a robot and cases in which they are a human or non-human animal. to 
show that these intuitions are in fact consistent, so that neither has to be abandoned, 
it must be demonstrated that there is a morally significant difference between the two 
types of cases, which explains why valid consent is a necessary condition for permis-
sible sexual activity if the non-consenting subject is a human or non-human animal 
but not when they are a robot. Solving this puzzle challenges us to refine our concep-
tion of the relation between consent and the permissibility of sexual activity, and to 
reflect on the ethics of robot-human interaction. 
this essay proceeds in the following way. In Section 1, I elaborate on the current 
and anticipated design of sex robots, as well as the sex robot industry, and provide a 
brief overview of the ethical debate on sex robots. In section 2, I clarify the notion of 
valid consent, and expand on its application in sexual ethics. In section 3, I explore 
and reject three possible ways to argue that there is a moral difference between robots 
on the one hand, and humans and non-human animals on the other hand, which 
renders it impermissible to have non-consensual sex with the latter but not with the 
former. In section 4, I argue that this moral difference is grounded in a discrepancy in 
moral status. Section 5 concludes. 
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1. Sex RobotS 
1.1 Design, Demand, and Development 
Sex robots (‘sexbots’) currently make up the only category of robots capable of 
having sex. Sexbots are robots designed for the purpose of providing sex for humans. 
they are programmed to engage in sexual activity, as their governing software neces-
sitates them to perform acts aimed at the sexual gratification of their users (levy 2009; 
Sparrow 2017). the sexbots currently available for sale look and behave moderately 
like humans, insofar as they have silicone skin and are realistically shaped, and are 
equipped with a rudimentary aI system that enables them to interact with their users 
through speech and affective communication (levy 2009; Sharkey et al. 2017; Sparrow 
2017). the sexbot companies that are currently best known are truecompanion, 
which has launched multiple editions of the female sexbot Roxxxy, and Realdoll, 
which sells customizable models of both male and female sexbots.1  
a number of surveys indicates that the market for sexbots has potential for sig-
nificant expansion in the future. Szczuka and krämer, for example, found that 40,3 
percent of the 229 heterosexual males who participated in their study could imagine 
buying a sexbot within the next five years (2017). likewise, Scheutz and arnold con-
ducted a small-scale survey, indicating that two thirds of the male participants were 
open to the idea of using sexbots in the near future (2016).2 furthermore, li, Ju and 
Reeves found that participants in their study were subject to increased physical 
arousal when they touched the ‘erotic zones’ of a sexbot, which suggests that there 
generally is no physiological barrier to sexual relationships between humans and 
robots (2016). 
moreover, experts believe that it lies within the scope of near future technologi-
cal possibilities to create sexbots that are far more sophisticated than those currently 
available. these sexbots will be autonomous and interactive, with flesh-like skin, af-
fective computing, highly developed sensory perception, refined language skills, the 
capacity to learn, and multiple preprogrammed personalities. they will adapt to the 
1.  See www.truecompanion.com and www.realdoll.com (both accessed 28 June 2017). other sexbot 
companies that are currently competing on the market are android love dolls and Sex bot com-
pany. 
2.  In stark contrast to the male participants, Scheutz and arnold found that two thirds of the 
female participants declared themselves to be opposed to the idea of having sex with a sexbot. I can 
not elaborate on this gender difference here. however, see Scheutz and arnold (2016) for possible 
explanations of this result. 
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sexual preferences of their user and base their sexual performance on an extensive 
amount of data, which will enable them to provide sexual gratification for their users 
(levy 2009; Richardson 2015; 2016; Sharkey et al. 2017; Sparrow 2017). 
these sexbots of the near future will also display sentient behaviour, such as 
the experience of sexual pleasure when internal sensors are triggered, without actu-
ally having qualitative experiences. moreover, their programming will cause them 
to demonstrate complex emotional behaviour, which will allow for the formation of 
intimate sexual and emotional relationships with their users. It is this characteristic 
that differentiates sexbots from sextoys. the creation of such sophisticated human-
oid sexbots can be expected to increase the number of individuals that is open to the 
idea of having sex with a robot (levy 2009; Richardson 2015; 2016; Sharkey et al. 2017; 
Sparrow 2017).3 
In this essay, I will be concerned solely with near future sexbots. hence, my con-
clusions might no longer hold if sexbots become increasingly advanced in the more 
distant future. 
1.2 Ethical Considerations
david levy has argued that there are strong reasons in favour of creating sophis-
ticated sexbots (2009). to begin with, he suggests that sexbots could replace human 
sex workers, which has the potential to curtail persisting harmful practices in the 
sex industry, such as sex slavery and sexual abuse. furthermore, he maintains that 
the availability of sexbots could offer a solution for individuals who experience dif-
ficulty finding sexual partners, and provide intimate companionship for those who 
feel lonely or isolated.4 moreover, it might be possible for sexbots to function as sat-
isfactory alternatives for individuals with sexual desires that are likely to cause harm 
3.  this anticipation is also supported by the results from a 2016 survey conducted by nesta. See 
nesta futurefest Survey, april 27, 2016, http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/nesta-futurefest-sur-
vey-2/ (accessed 23-07-2017). 
4.  for objections to this claim, see Giutu (2012) and Sullins (2012). 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 ROMY ESKENS66
to humans if brought into practice, such as the desire to have sex with children or to 
engage in violent or degrading sex without another agent’s consent.5 
there are also legitimate worries about possible negative effects of the devel-
opment of the sexbot industry. kathleen Richardson, who launched a campaign 
against Sex Robots in 2015, has stressed that the sexbot industry is mostly driven by 
heterosexual men who desire to buy robots that look realistically like women, but 
appear and behave in ways that exhibit harmful pornographic stereotypes of female 
attractiveness, personality and sexuality (2015; 2016). according to Richardson, this 
fact causes the design, sale and use of sexbots to express and reinforce persistent 
sexist and misogynist stereotypes about females, which she expects to have harmful 
consequences for women (2015; 2016; see also Scheutz and arnold 2016; Szczuka and 
krämer 2017).6 
even if the design, sale and use of sexbots will have no such effect on women, it 
might be wrong for individuals to interact with sexbots in ways that would be harmful 
if the recipients had been actual women. Robert Sparrow has argued that behaviour 
that has no extrinsic harmful effects can be morally objectionable in virtue of represent-
ing harmful behaviour (2017). Indeed, he maintains that because sexbots are intended 
to represent women, sexist and misogynistic behaviour towards sexbots is morally 
objectionable in virtue of representing such behaviour towards women (Sparrow 
2017). another way in which sexist or misogynist behaviour towards sexbots can be 
considered morally objectionable without having harmful effects on others concerns 
moral character. according to John danaher, for instance, such behaviour is expres-
sive of the defective moral character of the sexbot user, and is to be condemned on 
that basis (2017; see also Sparrow 2017). 
there are thus good reasons to be cautious of the design, sale and use of sexbots, 
although these reasons are far from definite. however, since the subject of this essay 
is the permissibility of non-consensual sexual relationships with robots, I will set 
these issues aside for the remainder of this essay. nonetheless, it should be kept in 
5.  this claim is highly disputed both within and outside of the academic community. this is in 
part because there is insufficient empirical evidence to support or oppose the claim that the desire to 
have potentially harmful sex with actual people diminishes when substitutes, such as sexbots, sex-
dolls and virtual pornography, are used. It is unlikely that such evidence will become available soon, 
since research on the topic is suffering from a lack of funding and a scarcity of willing participants, 
largely due to the ethical complexities involved in such research, and the moral contentiousness of 
the research subject. nonetheless, for an overview of some of the arguments for and against the use 
of sexbots as substitute subjects for potentially harmful sexual practices, see Rutkin (2016). 
6.  See www.campaignagainstsexrobots.org/ (accessed 28 June 2017). for objections to Richardson’s 
campaign against sexbots, see devlin (2015). 
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mind that although it might not be impermissible to have sex with robots for the 
reason that it is non-consensual, it might be impermissible for other reasons. 
2. ValId SexUal conSent
2.1 When Is Consent Valid? 
there is a general consensus in ethical discourse that valid consent is a neces-
sary condition for permissible sexual activity (see for instance archard 2007; cahill 
2001; cowling et al. 2017; Soble et al. 2002). there are many ongoing debates that 
concern the concept of valid consent or its applications to moral and legal disputes. 
Since this essay concentrates on clear cases of sexual non-consent, I will not engage 
extensively with these issues here, and this section will involve only a brief discus-
sion of the notion of valid consent and its relevance to sexual ethics. 
most philosophers engaged in the debate on valid consent identify three in-
dependent necessary conditions that are together sufficient for consent to be valid 
(kleinig 2010; mappes 2002; miller and Wertheimer 2010; Wertheimer 2003). the first 
condition demands that an agent’s consent is informed, which requires them to have 
knowledge of the relevant facts about the act they are consenting to, and to compre-
hend what they are consenting to on the basis of these facts. Secondly, consent must 
be given voluntarily, in which case there is no unduly influence, such as coercion, 
from another agent, which is causally linked to the act of consenting. thirdly, the 
consenting agent must be decisionally-capacitated, which requires them to have a 
grasp of the value and consequences of the act, on the basis of which they assess the 
risks, harms and benefits involved in this act. 
 once an agent who intends to consent to a certain act meets these conditions, 
they must express their consent to make it recognizable to others. this requires 
something more than a mental state or attitude of consent enjoyed by the consenting 
agent, since this would pave the way for mistaken postulations of consent. What is 
required for others to justifiably believe that an agent has consented is that this agent 
has performed their consent. they can do so either verbally or non-verbally. a non-
verbal performance of consent can occur with the performance of certain actions 
that do not involve language, such as nodding or initiating a certain activity. an act of 
consent can be performed verbally either in writing, for instance in signing a contract, 
or in speech, in uttering “yes” or its equivalent (kleinig 2010; mappes 2002; miller and 
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Wertheimer 2010; Wertheimer 2003).7 however, the criteria for the successful per-
formance of consent are extremely complex, varying with the relationships between 
the agents involved and the act to which an agent is consenting, and involving many 
other complicating factors on which there is ongoing academic disagreement. 
2.2 Sexual Non-consent
there are at least two categories of sexual non-consent. the first category con-
cerns cases in which the agents involved in sexual activity are capable of expressing 
valid consent, but one or more has withheld their consent. these are paradigmatic 
cases of rape. the focus of this essay, however, is on a second category, which in-
volves cases in which at least one agent’s consent to sex is lacking because they are, 
either temporarily or permanently, cognitively incapacitated to give valid consent at 
all. agents who lack or are incapable of exercising the cognitive capacities to meet 
the conditions for valid consent include non-human animals, children, and indi-
viduals who are severely cognitively disabled, unconscious or heavily intoxicated 
(henceforth, ‘cognitively incapacitated humans and non-human animals’). the ca-
pacities these agents lack or fail to exercise may be, amongst other things, the capac-
ity for rational deliberation, moral understanding, future-orientedness, or conscious 
experience. 
 the group of agents whose involvement in sexual activity is non-consensual 
because they are cognitively incapacitated to give valid consent includes sexbots as 
well. as became clear in the previous section, sexbots also lack the cognitive capaci-
ties necessary for valid consent, such as the capacities for moral understanding and 
conscious experience. Since valid consent is a necessary condition for permissible 
sexual activity, it seems to follow from this that the valid consent condition does not 
only rule out permissible sex with humans and non-human animals, but also with 
sexbots. 
this implication will strike many as counterintuitive. one initial response could 
be that the implication can be avoided simply by programming sexbots to perform 
actions that indicate consent, or even refusal of consent. for example, they could be 
7.  one helpful way to conceive of verbal performative consent is to understand it in terms of J. 
l. austin’s speech act theory (austin 1973). a speech act is an utterance that has not only semantic 
meaning (‘locution’) or causal effects (‘perlocution’), but is itself an act, performed by the agent in 
uttering a certain phrase (‘illocution’). thus, on this understanding, an agent can perform the act 
of consenting in uttering certain words. for such an interpretation of performative consent, see for 
example marta (1996) and cowart (2004). 
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coded to utter phrases that under the right conditions would express sexual consent, 
or to sometimes struggle as an indication of withheld consent. however, such a re-
sponse fails. Sexbots lack the cognitive capacities to satisfy the conditions for valid 
consent even when they are programmed to perform actions that would under the 
right circumstances constitute acts of consent. Performances of consent can be 
genuine acts of consent only if the cognitive conditions for valid consent have been 
met in the first place. Since sexbots are cognitively incapacitated to meet these condi-
tions, their performances are failed acts of consent, devoid of any normative force. 
merely programming sexbots in a way that causes them to display a void per-
formance of consent or non-consent is thus unsuccessful in showing that the valid 
consent condition does not render sexual relationships between humans and sexbots 
impermissible. Rather, if the conclusion that sex with robots is impermissible because 
it is non-consensual is to be avoided, without denying that valid consent is necessary 
for permissible sex with humans or animals, it must be demonstrated that there is a 
morally significant difference explaining why consent is a necessary condition for 
permissible sex if it involves humans or animals, but not if it involves robots. In the 
next section, I will discuss and reject three possible ways to do this. 
3. non-conSenSUal Sex: RobotS 
VeRSUS hUmanS/anImalS 
3.1 Artificiality 
one way to argue that there is such a morally significant difference is to stress 
that valid consent is required only from members of the human species, in virtue 
of their humanity. yet to ascribe such moral weight to the humanity of the parties 
involved is not only in itself questionable, on suspicion of unfounded speciesism, 
but also implies that all sexual activity with non-human animals is morally permis-
sible. to avoid this implication, the argument can be modified so that the perceived 
moral difference between non-consensual sex with humans and non-human animals 
on the one hand, and non-consensual sex with robots on the other hand, is explained 
by the fact that the former are organic and the latter artificial. however,  if the distinc-
tion between organic and artificial were morally relevant in this way, the incorpora-
tion of artificial body parts into a human body would diminish the moral weight of 
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this human being’s interests. this would mean that the more artificial body parts a 
human being has in their body, the less their consent matters. this is clearly absurd. 
finally, if the appeal to the distinction between organic and artificial bodies is 
supposed to indicate a moral difference between living and lifeless entities, life as 
such is deemed morally relevant for consent. Such a view would be highly implau-
sible, given that the demand for consent does not apply, nor should it, to all living 
entities, in virtue of being alive. however, if the claim is weakened as to assert that 
lifeless entities are essentially devoid of value, whereas some but not all living enti-
ties are valuable in a way that generates a moral incentive to seek their consent, the 
morally significant difference is no longer that between living and lifeless entities.   
3.2 Harmlessness 
another possible line of argument could be that the morally significant differ-
ence between non-consensual sex with a human or non-human animal and non-con-
sensual sex with a robot is that it harms the former but not the latter. I will under-
stand the notion of harm in the comparative sense, since this understanding is most 
likely to capture the complex way in which non-consensual sex can cause harm to 
non-consenting subjects, and is widely employed in ethical discourse. on the com-
parative understanding of harm, an act x harms an agent S if S is worse off as a con-
sequence of x. In other words, x harms S if S would have been better off if x had not 
been performed. 
non-consensual sex can cause harm to non-consenting subjects in many ways; 
physically, and particularly psychologically. for example, non-consensual sex is 
likely to involve the experience of pain in cases in which sex is forced on an indi-
vidual who has refused to give consent, although this is not true for every instance 
of non-consensual sex. another way in which non-consensual sex is often harmful 
to the individual whose consent is lacking is is in objectifying her as a mere means to 
sexual gratification, rather than as an end in themselves (archard 2007; baber 2002; 
mappes 2002). 
there is, of course, much more to say about the way in which non-consensual 
sex is harmful to those who undergo it. nonetheless, it is already clear at this point 
that involvement in non-consensual sexual relationships does not cause harm to 
sexbots, since sexbots lack the capacity to experience pain and, as objects, are not 
harmfully objectified. more generally, it seems that it is impossible for sexbots to be 
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harmed at all. for things can go better or worse for entities only if they have qualita-
tive experiences and enjoy some degree of consciousness. Since sexbots are non-sen-
tient entities that lack the capacity for conscious experience, they cannot be harmed. 
Still, however, it does not follow from the mere fact that an act of non-consensu-
al sex is harmless that it is permissible. to see this, consider the following case: 
Case I
A is a child who is unconscious at T1. B has non-consensual sex with A at T1, which 
B considers to be an act of love. There are no third parties involved or present who 
could report about the act, and there will be no other evidence of the sexual act, such 
as bodily traces. A will therefore never know that B had non-consensual sex with 
them at T1. 
In this case, a will experience neither physical nor psychological effects of b’s act 
of non-consensual sex with them at t1. moreover, the act of non-consensual sex does 
not harmfully objectify a as a mere means to sexual gratification, since b considers 
it to be an act of love by which they value a as an end in themselves. consequently, 
there is no reason to suppose that a is made worse off by this act. If a is not made 
worse off by the sexual act, the act does not harm them. Still, b’s act of non-consen-
sual sex with a at t1 is seriously wrong. this shows that the mere fact that an act of 
non-consensual sex is harmless is insufficient to render it permissible.  
3.3 Cognitive Deficiency
one could also argue that non-consensual sex with robots is permissible but 
non-consensual sex with humans or non-human animals is not, for the reason that, 
compared to humans and non-human animals, robots are too far down the scale of 
cognitive capacitation. In other words, the cognitive gap between robots on the one 
hand, and humans and non-human animals on the other hand, is large enough to 
cause a discrepancy in the permissibility of non-consensual sex. the explanation of 
this discrepancy would then be grounded in the fact that humans and non-human 
animals are cognitively more developed than robots, and hence approach the thresh-
old for valid consent more closely than robots. 
however, although cognitive capacities may come in degrees, valid consent is 
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binary rather than scalar: one has either given valid consent, or one has not, depend-
ing on whether or not the conditions for valid consent have been satisfied. to illus-
trate this with respect to valid sexual consent, consider the following case: 
Case II 
A has sex with B and C has sex with D. Both B and D are severely cognitively dis-
abled and incapable of giving valid consent to these sexual acts. B is more heavily 
cognitively disabled than D, because B has more developed cognitive capacities 
than D. 
In this case, both sexual acts are non-consensual, since both b and d are cogni-
tively capacitated to a degree that is insufficient to ground valid consent. however, 
on the account under consideration, the comparative permissibility of these acts 
would be affected by the fact that b finds themselves higher up the scale of cognitive 
capacitation than does d, since b more closely approaches the threshold for valid 
consent. this is an implausible view, since both acts of non-consensual sex seem 
equally wrong. this case thus illustrates that valid consent is binary, and that the 
degree to which an individual is cognitively capacitated does not matter for the per-
missibility of sexual activity when this degree is insufficient to ground valid consent. 
hence, there is no significant moral difference with respect to the permissibility of 
non-consensual sex between having the requisite capacities for valid consent to a 
certain insufficient degree and lacking these capacities completely. 
4. moRal StatUS 
Still, one could argue that the morally significant difference between robots one 
the one hand, and cognitively incapacitated non-human animals and humans on the 
other hand, is that the latter possess the requisite cognitive capacities to an insuffi-
cient degree, whereas the former are devoid of these capacities altogether. In the case 
of robots, the cognitive capacities necessary for valid consent are not just rudimen-
tary, distorted, or underdeveloped, as is true of cognitively incapacitated humans and 
non-human animals, but absent in the past, present and future. however, such an 
account does not function as an explanation of the discrepancy in the permissibil-
ity of non-consensual sex between cases in which the non-consenting subject is a 
Volume 5, Issue 2
Is Sex With Robots Rape? 73
robot and cases in which this subject is a human or non-human animal. the mere fact 
that robots are not on the scale of cognitive capacitation for consent at all, whereas 
humans and non-human animals are on this scale on a level too far down to meet 
the conditions for valid consent, does not single out a fact that is in itself morally 
significant. 
nonetheless, this fact does become morally significant if it is taken to be indica-
tive of moral status. on certain established accounts of moral status, sentience is both 
a necessary and sufficient condition for moral status (kagan 2016; mcmahan 2002; 
Singer 1993). Sentience is usually defined as the capacity to have qualitative experi-
ences, most importantly of pleasure and pain. Some philosophers argue that sapience 
is an additional ground for moral status (kagan 2016; mcmahan 2002). the notion 
of sapience refers to an entity’s capacity to enjoy a degree of psychological continu-
ity, which originates from certain sophisticated cognitive phenomena, such as self-
awareness, future-orientedness and moral understanding (kagan 2016; mcmahan 
2002). 
Since sexbots lack qualitative experiences, self-awareness, future-orientedness, 
and moral understanding, amongst other things, they are both non-sentient and 
non-sapient. Sexbots are therefore devoid of moral status. to say that sexbots lack 
moral status is to say that they do not matter morally for their own sake. If sexbots do 
not matter morally for their own sake, they are not the kind of entities that humans 
require consent from in order to do things to them, such as having sex with them. 
because humans do not require consent from sexbots, as entities that lack moral 
status, sexual relationships between humans and sexbots are not impermissible in 
virtue of being non-consensual. 
by contrast, insufficiently cognitively capacitated humans and non-human 
animals do have moral status, since they are sentient and, to varying degrees, also 
sapient. because they have moral status, they are entities we require consent from in 
order to do things to them, such as to engage in permissible sexual activity with them. 
hence, when insufficiently cognitively capacitated humans and non-human animals 
are, as a matter of fact, incapable of consenting, others must refrain from having sex 
with them. 
the morally significant difference between non-consensual sex with humans 
and non-human animals on the one hand, and robots on the other hand, thus seems 
to be that we require consent from entities that have moral status, such as humans 
and non-human animals, but not from entities that lack moral status. Since robots 
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are devoid of moral status, humans do not require consent from sexbots in order to 
have permissible sex with them. this explains why valid consent is a necessary con-
dition for permissible sex in the case of humans and non-human animals, but not in 
the case of robots. 
5. conclUSIon 
my aim in this essay has been to provide a plausible argument to show that 
there is a morally significant difference between non-consensual sex with robots and 
non-consensual sex with humans and non-human animals, which substantiates and 
justifies the intuition that the latter is impermissible but the former is not. I argued 
that the relevant moral difference is that robots are devoid of moral status, whereas 
humans and non-human animals are not. 
admittedly, this solution holds only insofar as sexbots are non-sentient and 
non-sapient. the conclusion of this paper is therefore conditional on scientific and 
technological developments in computer science, artificial intelligence and robot-
ics, which determine the level of cognitive sophistication enjoyed by robots. Indeed, 
would sexbots acquire some degree of sentience or sapience in the more distant 
future, and start to matter morally for their own sake, their design, sale and use for 
the purpose of providing sex for humans might become seriously wrong. 
finally, it is worth emphasizing that even if it is not impermissible to have sex 
with near future sexbots for the reason that it is non-consensual, it might well be im-
permissible for other reasons. as indicated in section 2, there are legitimate worries 
about harmful effects that sexual relationships with sexbots might have on others, 
particularly on women, as well as the intrinsic moral wrongness of certain behaviour 
that the availability of sexbots might facilitate. however, more philosophical reflec-
tion is needed to settle these issues, and to establish under what conditions, if at all, 
it would be permissible for humans to have sex with sexbots. 
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